On-chain investigationHyperliquid · Arbitrum · Ethereum20 November 2026

XMR1 hack: 420 buyers paid $13.51 million for a token that fell 99.8%

We traced every sale, every buyer and every bridge hop behind the collapse of a Monero token on 20 November.

Update, 20 November, 13:30 UTC: PerpetualCow, who speaks for Wagyu on X, says hackers stole the XMR1 deployer key from 1984.hosting, a web host that reported a serious cyberattack the same day. He has promised to personally refund everyone who lost money, and says Wagyu will relaunch. By 13:16 UTC none of the 10 largest buyers had received a transfer from another account on Hyperliquid since 06:00 UTC. The attacker's ETH had not moved by 12:38 UTC. Sales and buyers now run to 13:00 UTC. Details in section 11.
At a glance
XMR1 is a token that stands for Monero on Hyperliquid and is issued through Wagyu's bridge. On 20 November, the account that deployed XMR1 sent 5.2 million tokens to an account set up that morning. The attacker sold 369,623 of them to 420 buyers for $13.51 million, and the price fell from about $500 to $1. It moved the money to Arbitrum, swapped it for ETH and bridged most of it to Ethereum. At our last check, 7,348 ETH sat in three wallets. The same account still holds 99.97% of ZEC1, a Zcash token. PerpetualCow, who speaks for Wagyu, says the deployer key was stolen from a hacked web host, and he has promised refunds.
$13.5M
Paid by 420 buyers for the attacker's tokens
99.8%
Fall in the token's price
5.2 million
Tokens sent out of the deployer account
7,348 ETH
Still in three wallets at our last check
Key findingsEach line has its own share link
  1. $13.5M

    Paid by 420 buyers for 369,623 tokens the attacker sold between 04:49 and 10:28 UTC on 20 November.

  2. 5.2 million

    Tokens came out of the account that deployed XMR1, in three transfers between 04:46 and 05:16 UTC.

  3. 0.098 ETH

    From Tornado Cash, a mixer, was the first money the attacker's address received, at 03:30 UTC, eight minutes before it set up on Hyperliquid.

  4. 7,348 ETH

    Sits in three wallets. The largest share, 4,836 ETH, is in an Ethereum wallet that has never sent anything.

  5. 99.97%

    Of ZEC1, a Zcash token, is still in the same deployer account. The key that sent the dumped tokens controls it too.

  6. 75%

    Of the $13.51 million came from buy orders already waiting on the book. PerpetualCow, who speaks for Wagyu, says market makers took most of the loss and has promised refunds to everyone who lost money.

01 · What happenedA Monero token on Hyperliquid fell 99.8% in half an hour

Early on 20 November, a new account on the crypto exchange Hyperliquid started selling a token called XMR1. It had traded near $500 all week. Half an hour later, it was worth about $1.

XMR1 is a stand-in for Monero, the privacy coin, on that exchange. Lookonchain spotted the dump and asked whether the token had been hacked. News sites such as PANews picked up the post.

Bitquery reads every trade on Hyperliquid and every transfer on Arbitrum and Ethereum, so we followed the tokens and the money. They came out of the account that made XMR1 in the first place. Hundreds of buyers paid for them, and most of that money is now ETH in three wallets. The attacker's address got its first ETH from Tornado Cash, a mixer, eight minutes before it showed up on Hyperliquid.

XMR1 comes from Wagyu, a Monero swap service. PerpetualCow speaks for Wagyu on X. He says hackers stole the key to the deployer account from a web host that was itself hacked. The chain cannot show where a key came from. That part rests on his word.

XMR1 fell from about $500 to $1 in half an hourprice on Hyperliquid, 5-minute bars, 20 November (UTC)
$1$10$100$1,00004:0005:0006:0007:0008:0004:46 · 100,000 XMR1 arrive05:14 and 05:16 · 5.1 million moreabout $503 beforeabout $1 from 05:20
Log scale, so each line up is ten times the one below. Dashed lines mark the three transfers out of the deployer account. Trades come from the Hyperliquid dataset.

02 · The tokenWhat XMR1 is, and how a Monero swap puts it on Hyperliquid

Monero runs on its own chain and hides who sends what to whom, so it cannot trade on Hyperliquid itself. Services wrap it. You send them real Monero, and they hand you a token that trades on the spot order book there. Send the token back, and you get your Monero out.

Wagyu is one of these services. It offers private Monero swaps, and its docs describe a bridge that moves XMR to Hyperliquid as XMR1 and back. People use it as an XMR swap without signing up for an exchange.

On Hyperliquid, a new token starts life in one account. The whole fixed supply went to the account that deployed the token. Tokens leave it from there. Four days before the drain, it sent 20,000 and then 100,000 XMR1 to another account, which then paid small amounts to many users. Before the drain, the deployer still held 93% of the supply.

The deployer has one named API wallet, a key that can trade on its behalf. It is called "wagyu". Wagyu has since said this account is the XMR1 deployer.

03 · The transfersThree transfers took 5.2 million XMR1 out of the deployer account

The deployer sent tokens to the new account three times. The last transfer alone was 5 million tokens. The new account had been set up that same morning, and we call it the attacker.

On Hyperliquid, a transfer is a user-signed action. The account's own key signs it. API wallets are for trades. So whoever sent the tokens most likely had the deployer's main key. Wagyu says that key was stolen.

The transfers took the same steps as that top-up four days earlier. What changed was where they went: to a new address that began selling within minutes.

Transfer out of the deployer accountTokens sent (UTC time)
First100,000 at 04:46
Second100,000 at 05:14
Third5,000,000 at 05:16
Attacker's accountfunded at 03:30, set up at 03:38, first large sale at 04:49
The deployer account lost 5.2 million tokens in three stepstokens held by the account that deployed XMR1, every state snapshot
13M15M17M19M03:3004:3005:3006:3007:3018.6 million XMR1 (93% of the supply)13.4 million after the third transfer5,000,000 sent at 05:16
The exchange takes a snapshot about every 12 minutes, so each step shows up in the first snapshot after the transfer.

04 · The dumpThe attacker sold into the order book until the price hit $1

On a normal day, the whole market for the token traded about $6.9 million. The attacker sold that much in less than three minutes, counting from its first large sale. It did not stop there.

Buyers kept taking its tokens as the price slid. Most of the money, 76%, came in during the first 11 minutes. Once the price reached $1, the attacker kept selling there in smaller amounts until 06:35. It paused, then sold small amounts again from 07:38 to 10:28.

By 13:00 UTC it had sold only 7% of what it got. It still had about 309,000 tokens up for sale, most at $1. Millions more sat in its account, and nobody will pay the old price for them.

76% of the money came in before 05:00 UTCdollars the attacker raised, per 10 minutes
$0M$2M$4M$6M$8M$2.5M04:40$7.7M04:50$2.1M05:00$0.9M05:10$50K05:20$3K05:30$35K05:40$8K05:50$15K06:00$3K06:10$9K06:20$5K06:30$86K07:30$1K07:40$4K09:00$1K09:10$0K09:20$0K10:00$0K10:10$0K10:20Before 05:00: $10.2 millionPrice falling to $1At about $1
In total, the attacker sold 369,623 tokens for $13.51 million. Times are UTC on 20 November.

05 · The buyersWho paid the $13.51 million

Every dollar the attacker took came from someone who bought on the way down. We matched each sale to the buyer on the other side of the trade. There were 420 of them.

A few large buyers paid most of it. The biggest had left buy orders resting near the old price, and the attacker filled them for $3.56 million. Many small buyers paid little.

In all, 75% of the money came from buy orders that were already waiting on the book. Market makers trade that way. PerpetualCow agrees they took most of the loss. He has promised to pay back everyone who lost money, out of his own pocket.

The loss did not stop with the buyers. Every holder that morning saw its value fall by 99.8%. Whether they can still swap it back for real Monero depends on the bridge, which Wagyu says will come back.

27 large buyers paid 77% of the $13.5Mthe attacker's buyers, grouped by how much each paid
GroupTotal paidPaid $1M or more$3.6M · 1 accountPaid $100K to $1M$6.9M · 26 accountsPaid $10K to $100K$2.7M · 66 accountsPaid $1K to $10K$0.3M · 84 accountsPaid under $1K$44K · 243 accountsThe 27 accounts that paid $100K or more put in 77% of the $13.51 million.
Each of the attacker's sales matched to the account on the other side. 420 accounts in all.

06 · The side depositsSeven deposits that look like a Monero cash-out

Just before its big sales began, the attacker also sent 6,000 XMR1 to seven other accounts. At the price then, that was worth millions of dollars.

Four of them passed their tokens on about half a minute later, all to the same busy address. That address took the token from more than a hundred others that day, and it also holds other tokens from the same deployer. It looks like a swap service, maybe this same bridge, sweeping up its deposits. If so, the attacker tried to turn some of the tokens into real Monero.

Any Monero paid out would sit on the Monero chain, where we cannot follow it. The other three accounts still hold their tokens.

07 · The moneyHow the USDC became ETH on Ethereum

The attacker moved fast. Minutes after its first sale, it began to move USDC to Arbitrum through Hyperliquid's bridge.

On Arbitrum, it swapped the USDC for ETH through CoW Protocol, a DEX aggregator, then sent most of the ETH to Socket, a bridge router. Socket passed it on through Mayan and Stargate, two bridges, to Ethereum.

The ETH landed at the same address on Ethereum within minutes of each send. The bridges cost the attacker about 1.7% on the way. We matched each arrival to its send by amount and time.

Step, 20 NovemberAmount
Sold on Hyperliquid369,623 tokens for $13.51 million
USDC to Arbitrum$13.28 million in 11 transfers
Swapped on CoW$13.22 million USDC for 7,467 ETH
Bridged out6,929 ETH in 7 transactions
Arrived on Ethereum6,810 ETH
Sent to 0xf32d4,836 ETH
From the deployer account to a wallet on Ethereumwhere the tokens and the money went, 20 November
HYPERLIQUIDAccount that deployed XMR10x2077… · held 18.6 millionThe attacker, 0x1464…new account, set up 03:38 UTC420 buyerspaid $13.51 millionfor 369,623 XMR15.2MsoldSeven other accounts6,000 XMR1, 04:47 to 04:53USDC from the salesARBITRUM$13.28 million USDCwithdrawn in 11 transfers04:54 to 05:20 UTCCoW Protocol$13.22 million USDCswapped for 7,467 ETH538 ETH kepton the attacker's addresson Arbitrum6,929 ETH bridgedin 7 transactions via Socketto Mayan and StargateETHEREUM6,810 ETH arrivedat the same address, 0x1464…05:03 to 05:13 UTC4,836 ETHsent to 0xf32d…, which hasnever sent anything1,975 ETH kepton the attacker's addresson Ethereum
Every arrow is a public transfer or trade. Arbitrum transfers come from the Arbitrum dataset. Bridge arrivals were matched to sends by amount and time.

08 · The walletsWhere the 7,348 ETH sits

On Ethereum, the attacker first sent a small test amount to a new wallet. The larger sends followed within minutes. That wallet now holds two thirds of the ETH and has never sent anything.

The attacker kept the rest on Ethereum and Arbitrum. None of it had moved by 12:38 UTC, the newest Ethereum data we had. The full history behind these transfers is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset.

Two thirds of the ETH sits in one wallet that has never sent anythingwhere the 7,348 ETH was at the newest data
4,836 ETH0xf32d… on Ethereum66%1,975 ETHAttacker on Ethereum27%Attacker on Arbitrum538 ETH · 7%7,348 ETH, about $12.8 million at $1,740 per ETH
Newest data: 12:38 UTC on Ethereum, 13:03 UTC on Arbitrum. ETH valued at $1,740.

09 · The other tokensThe same account still holds almost all of ZEC1

XMR1 was not the only token this account created. The exchange's own records show it also deployed ZEC1, which stands for Zcash, and three other tokens.

It still holds almost all of ZEC1's supply. ZEC1 trades far less than the Monero token did, so a dump there could not raise much. But the key that sent the dumped tokens controls that supply too.

The deployer account still holds 99.97% of ZEC1share of each token's supply in the account that deployed it
0%50%100%XMR1 before the drain93%XMR1 now67%ZEC1 now99.97%TAO1 now100%TRX1 now100%
From Hyperliquid's public API at 13:16 UTC. The account also deployed MAX, a fifth token, not shown.

10 · The hackers' routeHackers used this Monero swap route four times this month

The token was already part of other stories we covered this month. Money from four hacks reached the exchange and bought it. That is the last step before Monero, where funds can no longer be traced. That was the route after the Across domain hijack, the Kava hack, the Lighter hack and the Safe wallet drain.

Nothing on-chain ties those thieves to this drain. Still, their buys show how much stolen money flowed through this one token, on its way to Monero, in the weeks before it broke.

Four hacks this month bought about $6.6 million of the tokenbought on Hyperliquid with money from hacks we covered
Across domain hijack, 10 Nov$0.1M · 179 XMR1Kava hack, 14 Nov$1.2M · 2,190 XMR1Lighter hack, 16 Nov$3.5M · 6,700 XMR1Safe wallet drain, 16 Nov$1.9M · 3,657 XMR1Together, about $6.6 million for 12,726 XMR1.
Figures from our earlier investigations, each linked in the text. Nothing ties those thieves to this drain.

11 · Wagyu's accountWagyu says the key was stolen from a hacked web host

PerpetualCow posts on X for Wagyu. His profile says he works on XMR through Wagyu. He first wrote at 09:36 UTC that he was not yet sure what happened. He said market makers took most of the hit and swap users lost nothing. He also said he was open to talks with whoever did it.

At 11:31 UTC he promised to pay back anyone who lost money making markets in XMR1. He wrote that nobody but him would lose money. He said Wagyu would launch again. At 12:48 UTC he posted a post-mortem. He says hackers broke into 1984.hosting, a web host Wagyu used. He says they got customer data and server files. The deployer key, he says, sat on an old server there. He had deleted that server, but the host kept its files. He promised that he would personally refund everyone who lost money.

An attack on the host was reported. 1984 ehf runs 1984.hosting from Iceland. It and CERT-IS, the national cyber team, put out a joint notice of a large and serious attack on its systems. The host stopped all its services for now, DV reported at 11:08 UTC on 20 November. The notice gives no time for the break-in.

Refunds will show on-chain once they start. By 13:16 UTC, none of the 10 largest buyers had got a transfer from another account on Hyperliquid since 06:00 UTC. At our last Ethereum read, 12:38 UTC, the attacker had not moved its ETH.

12 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us

We cannot confirm how the deployer's key was taken. Wagyu says it was stolen from the hacked host, and the host did report an attack. The attacker's address got its gas money from Tornado Cash, a common way to hide where funds came from. That fits an outside attacker. It does not prove one.

We cannot see the Monero side of the bridge, so we cannot tell how much Monero stands behind the tokens that are left.

We matched the bridge sends on Arbitrum to the arrivals on Ethereum by amount and time. We decoded one of them in full. If the ETH moves, it will move from three wallets that anyone can watch.

13 · The methodHow we traced the XMR1 hack

We read the deployer's balance from snapshots of the exchange's state, took the transfers from the actions each address signed, and matched every sale the attacker made to the buyer on the other side. Token facts, such as who deployed each token, come from Hyperliquid's public API.

For the money trail, we followed the USDC to Arbitrum and then every ETH transfer on Arbitrum and Ethereum. Contract names such as CoW Protocol and Mayan come from our own labels. We left out the fake tokens that bots sent to the attacker on Ethereum, a trick called address poisoning.

The full Ethereum history is also sold as files, as the Ethereum dataset on the Bitquery Data Store. For cases like this one, we also run crypto investigation services.

Limits on these findings

Hyperliquid data was read up to 13:16 UTC on 20 November 2026. Ethereum transfers were read up to 12:38 UTC and Arbitrum transfers up to 13:03 UTC. Anything after that is not covered.

How the deployer's key was taken comes from PerpetualCow, who speaks for Wagyu. The host and CERT-IS reported an attack, DV said; the link to the key is his account and cannot be seen on-chain.

The link between Wagyu and XMR1 comes from Wagyu's documentation, the name of the deployer's API wallet and PerpetualCow's posts. We have not asked Wagyu for comment. Sales and buyers are counted up to 13:00 UTC; the attacker still had tokens up for sale then.

Bridge arrivals on Ethereum were matched to sends on Arbitrum by amount and time. One of the seven was decoded in full.

The seven accounts that received 6,000 XMR1 behave like a swap service's deposit addresses. That is our reading of their behaviour. Any Monero paid out is not visible to us.

ETH is valued at $1,740, the price at 12:38 UTC on 20 November.

14 · The recordThe addresses behind the hack

0x207700bd207df757825f9193ef9c648c1c65e06a
0x048b75dc11fd31bc38808478fee0c08d4cc05eb3
0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf
0x33513047a342ea41bbcc6503aa8c889a8b5d05a4ef332354fba682fdc60b53ee
0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf
0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf
0xf32d7842611a5d63b875075dadd19c55f3f1dc59
0x0d52f93bd76d5b35f26da8b4d6cb63dfd57acee9
0x4c6d679eac539bf7c5a0b7ebd8949ae93b1e5ee9
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
0x50c4e75a512f2a14a7b304787adf79c4531a5909
0x1b6f68247603d6c3d1754680d9f73aee87d1791a8e51ec92bea1dfa58a47733e
0xc1062b7c5dc8e4b1df9f200fe360cdc0ed6e7741
0xd78d199f8c402e7b5cc2abe278df0412400a3bae
0x77b2043768d28e9c9ab44e1abfc95944bce57931
0x74a704c0b00bd9cb6c671e339f361718c7d885d5776d13074ecb0ed17edf4752
Run it yourself

Follow the money in plain English

Every trade and transfer behind these findings comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask who bought a token or where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Hyperliquid dataset.

List every fill a Hyperliquid account madeSee who holds a Hyperliquid spot tokenFollow ETH from a wallet, one transfer at a timeCheck an address against Bitquery's labels
Explore Bitquery MCP →Hyperliquid, Arbitrum and Ethereum data from Bitquery. Data read on 20 November 2026.
Legal disclaimer

This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, bridge, protocol or service.

The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Hyperliquid, Arbitrum and Ethereum on 20 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour, Hyperliquid's public records and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available.

References to Wagyu, PerpetualCow, 1984 ehf, CERT-IS, DV, Hyperliquid, Lookonchain, PANews, CoW Protocol, Socket, Mayan, Stargate or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The account that sold the tokens and the wallets that hold the money are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.

Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.

Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.

FAQ

Was XMR1 hacked?

Yes, Wagyu says so. The account that deployed the token sent millions of tokens to a fresh account, which sold them. He says hackers stole the deployer key from a web host that was itself hacked on 20 November. The chain cannot show where the key came from.

What is XMR1?

XMR1 is a token on Hyperliquid that stands for Monero. Wagyu, a Monero swap service, runs the bridge that issues it: send Monero in to get XMR1, and send XMR1 back to get Monero out.

Will XMR1 buyers get their money back?

Wagyu has promised to pay back everyone who lost money, and says users of the swap lost nothing. When we checked, none of the 10 largest buyers had received a transfer from another account on Hyperliquid since 06:00 UTC.

How much money did the attacker take?

Buyers on Hyperliquid paid the attacker $13.51 million for its tokens. It turned that money into ETH.

Where did the money go?

The attacker withdrew USDC to Arbitrum, swapped it for ETH through CoW Protocol, and bridged most of the ETH to Ethereum. The largest share sits in a wallet that has never sent anything.

What is a Monero swap?

A Monero swap service takes one coin and pays out Monero, or the other way round, often without an account. Wagyu also wraps Monero as a token so it can trade on Hyperliquid.

Is ZEC1 affected?

The same account that sent the dumped tokens still holds almost all of ZEC1's supply. Its ZEC1 balance stayed the same all week up to our check. The same key controls it.

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