XMR1 hack: 420 buyers paid $13.51 million for a token that fell 99.8%
We traced every sale, every buyer and every bridge hop behind the collapse of a Monero token on 20 November.
- $13.5M
- 5.2 million
- 0.098 ETH
- 7,348 ETH
- 99.97%
- 75%
01 · What happenedA Monero token on Hyperliquid fell 99.8% in half an hour
Early on 20 November, a new account on the crypto exchange Hyperliquid started selling a token called XMR1. It had traded near $500 all week. Half an hour later, it was worth about $1.
XMR1 is a stand-in for Monero, the privacy coin, on that exchange. Lookonchain spotted the dump and asked whether the token had been hacked. News sites such as PANews picked up the post.
Bitquery reads every trade on Hyperliquid and every transfer on Arbitrum and Ethereum, so we followed the tokens and the money. They came out of the account that made XMR1 in the first place. Hundreds of buyers paid for them, and most of that money is now ETH in three wallets. The attacker's address got its first ETH from Tornado Cash, a mixer, eight minutes before it showed up on Hyperliquid.
XMR1 comes from Wagyu, a Monero swap service. PerpetualCow speaks for Wagyu on X. He says hackers stole the key to the deployer account from a web host that was itself hacked. The chain cannot show where a key came from. That part rests on his word.
02 · The tokenWhat XMR1 is, and how a Monero swap puts it on Hyperliquid
Monero runs on its own chain and hides who sends what to whom, so it cannot trade on Hyperliquid itself. Services wrap it. You send them real Monero, and they hand you a token that trades on the spot order book there. Send the token back, and you get your Monero out.
Wagyu is one of these services. It offers private Monero swaps, and its docs describe a bridge that moves XMR to Hyperliquid as XMR1 and back. People use it as an XMR swap without signing up for an exchange.
On Hyperliquid, a new token starts life in one account. The whole fixed supply went to the account that deployed the token. Tokens leave it from there. Four days before the drain, it sent 20,000 and then 100,000 XMR1 to another account, which then paid small amounts to many users. Before the drain, the deployer still held 93% of the supply.
The deployer has one named API wallet, a key that can trade on its behalf. It is called "wagyu". Wagyu has since said this account is the XMR1 deployer.
03 · The transfersThree transfers took 5.2 million XMR1 out of the deployer account
The deployer sent tokens to the new account three times. The last transfer alone was 5 million tokens. The new account had been set up that same morning, and we call it the attacker.
On Hyperliquid, a transfer is a user-signed action. The account's own key signs it. API wallets are for trades. So whoever sent the tokens most likely had the deployer's main key. Wagyu says that key was stolen.
The transfers took the same steps as that top-up four days earlier. What changed was where they went: to a new address that began selling within minutes.
| Transfer out of the deployer account | Tokens sent (UTC time) |
|---|---|
| First | 100,000 at 04:46 |
| Second | 100,000 at 05:14 |
| Third | 5,000,000 at 05:16 |
| Attacker's account | funded at 03:30, set up at 03:38, first large sale at 04:49 |
04 · The dumpThe attacker sold into the order book until the price hit $1
On a normal day, the whole market for the token traded about $6.9 million. The attacker sold that much in less than three minutes, counting from its first large sale. It did not stop there.
Buyers kept taking its tokens as the price slid. Most of the money, 76%, came in during the first 11 minutes. Once the price reached $1, the attacker kept selling there in smaller amounts until 06:35. It paused, then sold small amounts again from 07:38 to 10:28.
By 13:00 UTC it had sold only 7% of what it got. It still had about 309,000 tokens up for sale, most at $1. Millions more sat in its account, and nobody will pay the old price for them.
05 · The buyersWho paid the $13.51 million
Every dollar the attacker took came from someone who bought on the way down. We matched each sale to the buyer on the other side of the trade. There were 420 of them.
A few large buyers paid most of it. The biggest had left buy orders resting near the old price, and the attacker filled them for $3.56 million. Many small buyers paid little.
In all, 75% of the money came from buy orders that were already waiting on the book. Market makers trade that way. PerpetualCow agrees they took most of the loss. He has promised to pay back everyone who lost money, out of his own pocket.
The loss did not stop with the buyers. Every holder that morning saw its value fall by 99.8%. Whether they can still swap it back for real Monero depends on the bridge, which Wagyu says will come back.
06 · The side depositsSeven deposits that look like a Monero cash-out
Just before its big sales began, the attacker also sent 6,000 XMR1 to seven other accounts. At the price then, that was worth millions of dollars.
Four of them passed their tokens on about half a minute later, all to the same busy address. That address took the token from more than a hundred others that day, and it also holds other tokens from the same deployer. It looks like a swap service, maybe this same bridge, sweeping up its deposits. If so, the attacker tried to turn some of the tokens into real Monero.
Any Monero paid out would sit on the Monero chain, where we cannot follow it. The other three accounts still hold their tokens.
07 · The moneyHow the USDC became ETH on Ethereum
The attacker moved fast. Minutes after its first sale, it began to move USDC to Arbitrum through Hyperliquid's bridge.
On Arbitrum, it swapped the USDC for ETH through CoW Protocol, a DEX aggregator, then sent most of the ETH to Socket, a bridge router. Socket passed it on through Mayan and Stargate, two bridges, to Ethereum.
The ETH landed at the same address on Ethereum within minutes of each send. The bridges cost the attacker about 1.7% on the way. We matched each arrival to its send by amount and time.
| Step, 20 November | Amount |
|---|---|
| Sold on Hyperliquid | 369,623 tokens for $13.51 million |
| USDC to Arbitrum | $13.28 million in 11 transfers |
| Swapped on CoW | $13.22 million USDC for 7,467 ETH |
| Bridged out | 6,929 ETH in 7 transactions |
| Arrived on Ethereum | 6,810 ETH |
| Sent to 0xf32d | 4,836 ETH |
08 · The walletsWhere the 7,348 ETH sits
On Ethereum, the attacker first sent a small test amount to a new wallet. The larger sends followed within minutes. That wallet now holds two thirds of the ETH and has never sent anything.
The attacker kept the rest on Ethereum and Arbitrum. None of it had moved by 12:38 UTC, the newest Ethereum data we had. The full history behind these transfers is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset.
09 · The other tokensThe same account still holds almost all of ZEC1
XMR1 was not the only token this account created. The exchange's own records show it also deployed ZEC1, which stands for Zcash, and three other tokens.
It still holds almost all of ZEC1's supply. ZEC1 trades far less than the Monero token did, so a dump there could not raise much. But the key that sent the dumped tokens controls that supply too.
10 · The hackers' routeHackers used this Monero swap route four times this month
The token was already part of other stories we covered this month. Money from four hacks reached the exchange and bought it. That is the last step before Monero, where funds can no longer be traced. That was the route after the Across domain hijack, the Kava hack, the Lighter hack and the Safe wallet drain.
Nothing on-chain ties those thieves to this drain. Still, their buys show how much stolen money flowed through this one token, on its way to Monero, in the weeks before it broke.
11 · Wagyu's accountWagyu says the key was stolen from a hacked web host
PerpetualCow posts on X for Wagyu. His profile says he works on XMR through Wagyu. He first wrote at 09:36 UTC that he was not yet sure what happened. He said market makers took most of the hit and swap users lost nothing. He also said he was open to talks with whoever did it.
At 11:31 UTC he promised to pay back anyone who lost money making markets in XMR1. He wrote that nobody but him would lose money. He said Wagyu would launch again. At 12:48 UTC he posted a post-mortem. He says hackers broke into 1984.hosting, a web host Wagyu used. He says they got customer data and server files. The deployer key, he says, sat on an old server there. He had deleted that server, but the host kept its files. He promised that he would personally refund everyone who lost money.
An attack on the host was reported. 1984 ehf runs 1984.hosting from Iceland. It and CERT-IS, the national cyber team, put out a joint notice of a large and serious attack on its systems. The host stopped all its services for now, DV reported at 11:08 UTC on 20 November. The notice gives no time for the break-in.
Refunds will show on-chain once they start. By 13:16 UTC, none of the 10 largest buyers had got a transfer from another account on Hyperliquid since 06:00 UTC. At our last Ethereum read, 12:38 UTC, the attacker had not moved its ETH.
12 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us
We cannot confirm how the deployer's key was taken. Wagyu says it was stolen from the hacked host, and the host did report an attack. The attacker's address got its gas money from Tornado Cash, a common way to hide where funds came from. That fits an outside attacker. It does not prove one.
We cannot see the Monero side of the bridge, so we cannot tell how much Monero stands behind the tokens that are left.
We matched the bridge sends on Arbitrum to the arrivals on Ethereum by amount and time. We decoded one of them in full. If the ETH moves, it will move from three wallets that anyone can watch.
13 · The methodHow we traced the XMR1 hack
We read the deployer's balance from snapshots of the exchange's state, took the transfers from the actions each address signed, and matched every sale the attacker made to the buyer on the other side. Token facts, such as who deployed each token, come from Hyperliquid's public API.
For the money trail, we followed the USDC to Arbitrum and then every ETH transfer on Arbitrum and Ethereum. Contract names such as CoW Protocol and Mayan come from our own labels. We left out the fake tokens that bots sent to the attacker on Ethereum, a trick called address poisoning.
The full Ethereum history is also sold as files, as the Ethereum dataset on the Bitquery Data Store. For cases like this one, we also run crypto investigation services.
Hyperliquid data was read up to 13:16 UTC on 20 November 2026. Ethereum transfers were read up to 12:38 UTC and Arbitrum transfers up to 13:03 UTC. Anything after that is not covered.
How the deployer's key was taken comes from PerpetualCow, who speaks for Wagyu. The host and CERT-IS reported an attack, DV said; the link to the key is his account and cannot be seen on-chain.
The link between Wagyu and XMR1 comes from Wagyu's documentation, the name of the deployer's API wallet and PerpetualCow's posts. We have not asked Wagyu for comment. Sales and buyers are counted up to 13:00 UTC; the attacker still had tokens up for sale then.
Bridge arrivals on Ethereum were matched to sends on Arbitrum by amount and time. One of the seven was decoded in full.
The seven accounts that received 6,000 XMR1 behave like a swap service's deposit addresses. That is our reading of their behaviour. Any Monero paid out is not visible to us.
ETH is valued at $1,740, the price at 12:38 UTC on 20 November.
14 · The recordThe addresses behind the hack
Follow the money in plain English
Every trade and transfer behind these findings comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask who bought a token or where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Hyperliquid dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, bridge, protocol or service.
The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Hyperliquid, Arbitrum and Ethereum on 20 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour, Hyperliquid's public records and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available.
References to Wagyu, PerpetualCow, 1984 ehf, CERT-IS, DV, Hyperliquid, Lookonchain, PANews, CoW Protocol, Socket, Mayan, Stargate or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The account that sold the tokens and the wallets that hold the money are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.
FAQ
Was XMR1 hacked?
Yes, Wagyu says so. The account that deployed the token sent millions of tokens to a fresh account, which sold them. He says hackers stole the deployer key from a web host that was itself hacked on 20 November. The chain cannot show where the key came from.
What is XMR1?
XMR1 is a token on Hyperliquid that stands for Monero. Wagyu, a Monero swap service, runs the bridge that issues it: send Monero in to get XMR1, and send XMR1 back to get Monero out.
Will XMR1 buyers get their money back?
Wagyu has promised to pay back everyone who lost money, and says users of the swap lost nothing. When we checked, none of the 10 largest buyers had received a transfer from another account on Hyperliquid since 06:00 UTC.
How much money did the attacker take?
Buyers on Hyperliquid paid the attacker $13.51 million for its tokens. It turned that money into ETH.
Where did the money go?
The attacker withdrew USDC to Arbitrum, swapped it for ETH through CoW Protocol, and bridged most of the ETH to Ethereum. The largest share sits in a wallet that has never sent anything.
What is a Monero swap?
A Monero swap service takes one coin and pays out Monero, or the other way round, often without an account. Wagyu also wraps Monero as a token so it can trade on Hyperliquid.
Is ZEC1 affected?
The same account that sent the dumped tokens still holds almost all of ZEC1's supply. Its ZEC1 balance stayed the same all week up to our check. The same key controls it.
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