On-chain analysisSolanaWash tradingHomoglyphs

SOL/SOL: the Cyrillic counterfeits that printed $330 billion of fake volume on Solana.

Someone deployed counterfeit copies of SOL, BTC, USDC, USDT and TRX on Solana, most of them spelled with Cyrillic letters that look like the real ones. Then they traded the fakes against each other, in pools where both sides are forged, until 39 wallets had printed $330 billion of volume in 30 days. Only about $192K of real money went in. The fake prices then travel off-chain. Sites that index every pool picked them up, and a Bitget Wallet web page prices counterfeit SОL at about a hundred dollars a coin.

At a glance
A cluster of counterfeit majors on Solana traded $330 billion of volume in 30 days across 87 pools. SОL, ВТС, WВТС, USDС, USDТ, ТRX and ЕТН are each spelled with Cyrillic or other lookalike letters. Behind it all are 39 wallets, and one of them made 21,720 of the 27,401 trades. Real money entering the whole system came to about $192K, most of it what looks like the scheme's own float. The trading gives the fakes real-looking prices, and sites that index every pool pass them on.
$330B
30-day volume across the counterfeit cluster
39
Wallets behind all of it
21,720
Trades by the single busiest wallet
~$192K
Real money that entered, versus $330B printed

Corrected on 11 September 2026. The first version of this piece put the cluster's volume at $170 billion, its trades at 22,083 and its wallets at 56. A counting step had dropped swaps that the data stores only once, and had missed swaps listed under the other token in a pair. The figures, the volume table and both charts now use the corrected counts, and the BNB Chain section has been rewritten.

01 · The trick, in one glyphTwo letters that are not the same letter

Look at these two symbols, SOL and SОL. In most fonts they look the same. Put each letter's Unicode code point under it and the forgery gives itself away.

The same word, letter by letterwhat your eyes see versus what the software sees
REAL TICKER
S
U+0053
Latin
O
U+004F
Latin
L
U+004C
Latin
COUNTERFEIT TICKER
S
U+0053
Latin
О
U+041E
Cyrillic
L
U+004C
Latin

The middle letter of the second ticker comes from another alphabet. A Unicode inspector decodes it as Cyrillic capital O. Someone scanning a wallet or a DEX screener reads the two tickers as one symbol. Software that matches tokens by string sees two different assets.

The rest of the scheme is built on that one letter. Deploy a token whose symbol is SОL and a filter that blocks the plain word "SOL" will not catch it, yet anyone who sees it reads Solana. The same trick made the rest of the family we found: ВТС and WВТС for Bitcoin, USDС for USD Coin, USDТ for Tether, ТRX for Tron and ЕТН for Ether. We have met this alphabet before. Our address-poisoning investigation traced a fake Tether on Ethereum whose ticker hides a Cyrillic Dze and Te, and it reached over a million addresses. This time we pulled the 30 days of Solana DEX trades to 11 September through Bitquery MCP and traced the trading cluster behind the fakes.

02 · A market where both sides are fakeCounterfeits quoting counterfeits

You would expect a fake token to trade against a real one, fishing for victims. Mostly, these don't. The fake SОL's main pool is an Orca Whirlpool that pairs it with a fake USDT. That token's symbol is plain ASCII, but its mint starts with a vanity usd2; the real Tether mint starts with Es9v. The fake USDС trades mostly against the fake ТRX. The fake ВТС trades mostly against two more fakes, a "USDC" and a "USDT" with plain ASCII symbols. Nearly every price in this market is quoted in another forged asset, so whoever runs it can print any number on both sides of a trade.

The counterfeit cluster, ranked by printed volume30 days of DEX trades · per-token, USD cross-checked
SОL · "wSоIапа" · 5 wallets5,063 trades
$107.7B
USDС · "USD Соiп" · 3 wallets2,674 trades
$92.5B
USDT · vanity usd2 address · 6 wallets3,724 trades
$69.7B
ВТС · "Вitсоiп" · 4 wallets5,696 trades
$59.2B
ТRX · vanity tRx address · 3 wallets1,583 trades
$53.2B
USDС · "U$D Соin" · 9 wallets1,853 trades
$48.2B
USDТ.z · "Теthеr USD Вridgеd ZЕD20" · 1 wallet1,093 trades
$39.4B
ВТС · vanity BTCw address · 2 wallets704 trades
$25.6B
The eight largest of the 21 counterfeits. USD volume takes the lower of the two sides' USD values on each swap, and counts a swap only when both sides are priced within 10x of each other. A swap between two counterfeits counts under both tokens, so the rows do not sum. Counted once per swap across all 21 tokens, including swaps against seven more tokens outside the 21: $329.5B of volume, 27,401 trades, 87 pools and 39 wallets. The mint addresses are dressed up too. Vanity prefixes like SoJh, BTCw, tRx, USYb and usd2 make the address itself read like the real asset.

The busiest wallet, GcsrTAWg9vxeDLwcWScM6q513W8PYkXBViHofESDsGM1, traded 16 of the 21 fakes and made 21,720 of the cluster's 27,401 trades. Three other wallets made almost all of the rest. This is wash trading at its simplest, with a handful of wallets moving tokens through pools nobody else uses. Our flip-hour investigation found the same small-wallet pattern behind fake Solana volume.

03 · The SOL/SOL poolsSelf-paired, so the pair reads like a typo

The oddest corner of the cluster is three small Orca Whirlpools, each pairing a fake SОL directly with real wrapped SOL. On any UI that renders symbols, the pair shows as SOL against SOL, the same coin on both sides. One of the pools did thirteen trades for about twenty dollars. Pools this small earn nothing. Their likely job is to tie the fake into the real coin's liquidity. A router can then find a price path to it, and a screener lists it as one more SOL market.

04 · The price is the productA counterfeit that tracks the real chart

The fake SОL's price stays close to real SOL's. Of the eleven days after its launch day that have a dollar close, it closed within five dollars of real SOL on eight. On the other three it trailed by eight to fifteen dollars. It sat near $94 for its first days, then jumped to about $104 on 28 August, a day after real SOL closed above $109. A closed loop does not drift toward the real price by chance, so the likeliest reading is that whoever runs it resets the fake's price from time to time.

Counterfeit SОL versus real SOL, daily closethe fake's dollar price stays near the real one
$0$25$50$75$100Aug 24Aug 28Sep 1Sep 5Sep 10real SOLfake SОL
Daily closes in US dollars, from DEX trade data for SoJh2C73YT4WPcpG7Uy8HLPe5q67wJ9pEE1kxf4GhTC and wrapped SOL. The fake's launch day, 24 August, closed at a fraction of a cent and is left out. Gaps are days when it traded only against another fake USDT that has no dollar price.

The forged price does not stay on-chain. Data feeds that index every pool pick it up, and it shows up again on sites with real logos. Bitget Wallet's website has an auto-made "How to Buy SОL" page for the fake mint that prices it at about a hundred dollars. Birdeye's chart widget draws its candles. MyToken, a token listing site, quotes the fake usd2 Tether at a dollar. We have no reason to think any of these sites is in on it. Their feeds take in whatever trades, and this cluster traded $330 billion in a month.

05 · Where the real money wentAlmost nowhere

We measured every trade in the cluster where the other side was a real asset, meaning real USDC, wrapped SOL or Tether. Over the month, about $192K of real value went in and about the same came out. Nearly all of it sat in two pools that pair a fake Tether with real USDC. One wallet ran the first pool, two wallets ran the second, and each pool saw about 570 trades. That looks like the scheme's own float, keeping a dollar price alive. Every other pool that paired a fake with a real asset took in under fifty dollars of real money in the month.

So the DEX is not where this scheme makes money, if it makes any. Almost nobody is swapping real SOL for SОL. A fake with a live price is useful wherever a victim sees it. It can sit in a wallet as a four-figure balance, or stand in as the "payment" in an off-chain deal. Address poisoning works the same way, using the chain only as a display. We found no victims in this data, so treat that use as our reading of the pattern. The laptop token piece covered a plainer version of the trick, with thousands of contracts copying one memecoin's ticker.

06 · Beyond SolanaLookalike tickers on BNB Chain

Lookalike tickers turn up on BNB Chain too, and there they work differently. Hundreds of tokens whose symbols spell majors such as USDT, BTC or ETH in borrowed letters, like ՍՏⅮꓔ, traded there in August alone. Many sit at addresses ending in 8888, but Chinese-language meme coins on BNB Chain use that suffix too, so on its own it does not point to one crew. The bigger difference is who they trade with. From 12 to 31 August, almost all of their trades were against real USDT, USDC, BNB or BTCB, spread across thousands of wallets, for about $44 million of volume. Real money changes hands there, which makes it a different scheme from the closed loop on Solana.

Stage 1Forge
Deploy the token with a homoglyph symbol and a vanity address. Both read as the real asset before the first trade.
Stage 2Print
Wash-trade it against a second counterfeit so both sides of every price are yours. Steer the chart to track the real asset. No victims are needed at this stage. The volume is how the price gets made.
Stage 3Display
Let indexers and price sites pick up the price. Now a bag of the counterfeit can show a dollar value on a real screen.

07 · The quiet partZero tweets

Fake volume on a pump usually comes with a social media push. This cluster has none. On 11 September we searched X for the fake SОL's mint address and found zero posts, with no shills and no "gem" calls. Its likely audience is software, meaning the indexers and price feeds that read every pool.

We found no earlier public report of this cluster or its mints. Automated screens do catch them. Jupiter's token search flags every mint in the volume table as suspicious. The closest earlier work is general. The FBI warned about token-impersonation scams in 2024. In March, a GitHub issue asked Trust Wallet to act on a different set of fake USDT and SOL mints on Solana. It is still open, with no reply from the company. Its author wrote that "obvious scam tokens remain active in the wallet, while legitimate projects are rejected or delayed."

What made this possible

Every figure ran through Bitquery's trading data

We screened every token symbol in 30 days of DEX trades for non-Latin letters. Then we worked pool by pool. For each one we checked the token on the other side, the USD value of both sides of each swap, the wallet count and the share of real money. All of it comes from DEX trade data queried through Bitquery MCP. Every trade row carries the raw symbol and the mint address, so one SQL filter finds any ticker with non-Latin letters in it.

Find every token whose symbol mixes in Cyrillic, Greek or Armenian lettersList the pools a token trades in and the token on the other sidePrice both sides of a swap in USD and keep the lower valueCount the wallets behind a pool's volumeSplit real money from printed volume, pool by pool
Explore Bitquery MCP Reproducible: connect a client to mcp.bitquery.io and have it run SQL for token symbols that contain Cyrillic, Greek or Armenian letters, ranked by 30-day volume. SQL access needs a paid plan. On 11 September the counterfeits in this piece ranked near the top of that list. The fake USDT uses a plain ASCII symbol, so only its mint address gives it away.

08 · The trading clockBusy from 02:00 UTC, near-silent by 22:00

Wash bots can run around the clock. This one does not. Bucket the cluster's trades by hour of day and a daily rhythm appears. Trading is heavy from 02:00 to 18:00 UTC, dips around midday, thins out from 19:00 and all but stops at 22:00. In the two hours before midnight UTC, the busiest wallet placed zero trades in the entire month, and the whole cluster managed nine.

Cluster trades by UTC hour of day30 days, all 27,401 trades in the counterfeit cluster
00:0006:0012:0018:0023:00UTC hour of daybusy hoursquiet hours, 20:00–01:00 UTC
Trades per hour of day, summed over the month. The quiet stretch runs from 20:00 to 01:00 UTC, and 22:00 and 23:00 are close to zero. The cluster traded on every day of the week, and Sunday was the quietest.

Read as someone's sleep, the quiet hours point to a clock somewhere between UTC+3 and UTC+6. Treat that as a weak hint. A bot can run on any schedule, and a server clock says nothing about the person who set it up. The Cyrillic letters carry no clue about the people behind this either. The scheme uses them because they look like Latin ones.

09 · Screen it yourselfThree checks before you trust a symbol

Check the code points behind the letters
Compare the symbol's Unicode code points with the real asset's. A Cyrillic, Greek, Armenian or Roman-numeral letter inside a major's ticker means a counterfeit. Bitquery's trade data carries the raw symbol and mint address on every trade, so a screener can catch these with one filter.
Check who is on the other side
Pull the pool's quote token and check its mint address against the real one. On Solana, a 'USDT' whose mint does not start with Es9v prices nothing. A pair that shows the same symbol on both sides is a self-paired counterfeit.
Check wallets against volume
Billions in volume from a handful of wallets is a printing press. Count the distinct, unconnected wallets in the pool, and measure how much real value crosses it.

If you build token lists, wallet UIs or screeners on DEX trade streams, the fix is cheap. Fold lookalike letters to Latin before you compare symbols, and identify tokens by mint address. A price that only exists inside a closed loop of forged quotes is no price at all.

Legal disclaimer

This is not financial advice. This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, tax, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation, solicitation, or offer to buy, sell, or hold any token.

The findings characterize on-chain transaction patterns and inferences drawn from them. They are not assertions that any specific person or entity engaged in unlawful conduct, and should not be read as accusations of criminal or regulatory wrongdoing. Token symbols and contract addresses are referenced solely to make the on-chain analysis reproducible. References to third-party websites that surfaced auto-generated pages for these tokens describe automated indexing pipelines, and are not claims that those companies participated in, endorsed, or were aware of the activity described.

On-chain figures (wallet counts, volumes, prices, and timestamps) were reconstructed from DEX trade data over a 30-day window and may be incomplete or subject to revision as additional data becomes available. USD figures attached to trades between counterfeit assets are nominal values printed by the scheme itself and do not represent real economic value. Cross-checked USD figures take the lower of the two USD values on each swap, and count a swap only when both sides are priced within 10x of each other. Each swap is counted once, with re-indexed copies of the same trade removed.

The timezone discussion in this article is speculative and circumstantial. It infers a possible clock offset from the timing of on-chain activity, and nothing more. Automated systems can be scheduled to imitate any timezone, server time reflects infrastructure rather than people, and the use of Cyrillic or other non-Latin characters indicates only the mechanics of a homoglyph attack, never the language, nationality, ethnicity, or location of any person. No statement in this article attributes this activity to any country, region, or group, and none should be inferred.

Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and product names are the property of their respective owners.

Identify tokens by mint address

The data that exposed this cluster can also protect a product from it. It covers every DEX trade on nine chains, in real time, with mint addresses and USD values for both sides of each swap.